The Identification of Agglomeration Economies by Combes, Pierre-Philippe et al.
The Identification of Agglomeration Economies
Pierre-Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, Laurent Gobillon
To cite this version:
Pierre-Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, Laurent Gobillon. The Identification of Agglomera-
tion Economies. 2010. <halshs-00535593>
HAL Id: halshs-00535593
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00535593
Submitted on 12 Nov 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
 
 
GREQAM 
Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Document de Travail  
n°2010-38 
The Identification of Agglomeration 
Economies 
 
 
 
Pierre-Philippe COMBES 
Gilles DURANTON 
Laurent GOBILLON 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
November 2010 
 
The Identification of Agglomeration Economies
Pierre-Philippe Combes∗†
Greqam, Aix-Marseille University
Gilles Duranton∗‡
University of Toronto
Laurent Gobillon∗§
Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques, PSE and CREST
April 2010
Abstract: Measures of urban productivity are typically positively
associated with city population. But is this relationship causal? We
discuss the main sources of bias in the proper identification of agglom-
eration effects. We also assess a variety of solutions that have been
proposed in the literature to deal with them.
Key words: agglomeration economies, instrumental variables, structural estimation, natural ex-
periments
jel classification: r12, r23
∗Many thanks to Thierry Magnac and Diego Puga for a number of useful conversations. Financial support from the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Combes) and from the Canadian Social Science and Humanities Research
Council (Duranton) is gratefully acknowledged.
†greqam, 2 Rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02, France (e-mail: ppcombes@univmed.fr; website: http://
www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/pp/combes/). Also affiliated with the Centre for Economic Policy Research, International
Trade and Regional Economics programme.
‡Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 Saint George Street, Toronto, Ontariom5s 3g7, Canada (e-mail:
gilles.duranton@utoronto.ca; website: http://individual.utoronto.ca/gilles/default.html). Also affiliated
with the Centre for Economic Policy Research, International Trade and Regional Economics programme.
§Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques, 133 Boulevard Davout, 75980 Paris cedex 20, France (e-mail:
laurent.gobillon@ined.fr; website: http://laurent.gobillon.free.fr/). Also affiliated with the Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, International Trade and Regional Economics programme.
1. Introduction
The economic approach to cities argues that cities result from a tradeoff between urban costs and
urban benefits, both of which increase with urban scale. If there were only costs to cities, we
would all disperse. If there were only benefits, we would all agglomerate in one city. To put this
cornerstone idea about cities on a safe empirical footing, research has gone beyond this ‘out-of-
necessity’ argument and has attempted to measure the benefits from cities. It has done so mostly by
focusing on how urban scale affects various measures of urban productivity. This paper discusses
the econometric challenges associated with this endeavour and how successful it has been.
More precisely, the agglomeration economies vs. urban costs approach to cities rests on four
claims: (i) there are urban costs; (ii) there are agglomeration economies; (iii) agglomeration eco-
nomies dominate for small population sizes whereas urban costs dominate for large sizes; (iv)
there is some mobility across cities (or between cities and their rural hinterland) so that the size of
a city depends on what existing residents might get elsewhere.1 Empirical research has taken (i) to
be mostly obvious. Land is in finite quantity. So is the roadway. Bringing in more people should
raise urban costs. The focus of extant research has instead been on (ii), the measurement of the
benefits from agglomeration. This is an obvious prerequisite to dealing with (iii) and (iv).
The proper identification of agglomeration benefits is also important for a range of other reas-
ons. Many local public policy initiatives attempt to foster agglomeration economies by building
clusters, attracting ‘talent’, or luring large industrial facilities. The benefits to be expected from
such policies are in direct relation with the intensity of agglomeration economies. It is also the
case that a full cost-benefit analysis of most urban infrastructure projects requires knowing about
agglomeration effects. For instance, a new urban highway or a new transit line might affect ag-
glomeration both directly by easing interactions within the city and indirectly through population
and employment growth.
The scope of this paper is purposefully narrow and our review intends to be selective. We are
interested in measuring the elasticity of various measures of urban productivity, mainly wages,
with respect to urban scale and we examine the econometric pitfalls associated with this enterprise.
We do not try to distinguish between possible sources of agglomeration economies. We do not
broaden the discussion to related topics such as urban growth either. Melo, Graham, and Noland
(2009) propose a meta-analysis of all published results on the topic. The sources of agglomeration
economies are discussed by Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Puga (2010). Henderson (2007)
proposes a broader discussion of agglomeration effects.
In the following, section 2 derives a simple specification that has been often used in the lit-
erature. The sources of bias are discussed in section 3. Our assessment of the various solutions
proposed in the literature to overcome these biases is in section 4 before our conclusion.
1Urban costs are at the heart of the monocentric model of cities developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth
(1969), the founding model of urban economics. The integration of costs and benefits of cities in a model of an entire
urban system is by Henderson (1974).
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2. The model
We start with a simple model. It allows us to describe key identification issues in the estimation of
agglomeration economies. Firm j located in city c operates under constant returns. Its output yj is
yj = Aj kθj l
1−θ
j ,
where Aj is technology, k j capital, and lj labour measured in efficiency units. In turn, labour is
given by
lj =∑
i
eij`i,
where `i is the number of hours worked by worker i and eij measures the efficiency of this
worker. With competitive markets for final goods and inputs, the first-order conditions for profit
maximisation reduce to
wij = Φj eij , (1)
where wij is the hourly wage of worker i and Φj is a wage shifter for firm j defined as
Φj ≡ (1− θ)θθ/(1−θ)
(
pj Aj
rθj
)1/(1−θ)
. (2)
with pj the revenue per unit sold (net of intermediate consumptions and trade costs, if any, born
on exported units) and rj is the cost of capital, k j.
Equations (1) and (2) summarise the key effects. Wages are high in cities that benefit from pure
externalities which increase either technology, Aj, or labour efficiency, eij. Wages are also high
when market access is good as it implies high prices net of trade costs, pj. Finally, wages are
also higher when the cost of capital, rj, is low. More generally, if we think more broadly about
k j and have it represent non-labour inputs, rj will also depend on the price of land and the cost
of intermediates used in production. All this implies that urban scale may raise wages through
a variety of channels: better technology (Aj), higher labour efficiency (eij), higher prices (pj), and
lower costs of other factors (rj).
While we return to most of them below, a number of issues must be kept in mind before we
proceed. First, because we cannot track technology independently from input prices or the costs
of other factors, we can only estimate a ‘net’ effect of agglomeration That is, we assess the effect of
urban scale on the wage shifter Φj in equation (1). Second, the assumption of competitive markets
for inputs and final goods may raise some concerns. Given our objective, these concerns are not
major. To understand why, note first that if prices were a fixed markup on marginal cost (or if
wages were a fixed fraction of the marginal product of labour), equation (1) would be barely
affected – only the constants would differ. However, price markups may change with urban
scale. In this case, any pro-competitive effects associated with lower price markups in larger cities
will be estimated as part of the ‘agglomeration’ effects. Third, we focus on wages. A legitimate
alternative is to estimate total factor productivity (tfp) and assess how it is affected by urban
scale. We believe that, in practice, this alternative approach has only one minor advantage and
a significant drawback. With a reasonable measure of capital, one can condition out differences in
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capital intensity. This may remove a confounding factor.2 On the other hand, current approaches to
tfp are weak at dealing with differences in labour quality, a fundamental issue in the estimation of
agglomeration effects. Fourth, the model accounts for differences in workers’ individual efficiency,
e, in a limited way. Workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes after their labour is expressed in
efficiency units. In practice, we expect some substitution across skill groups. This specification
issue remains unresolved.3 Finally, our model is purposefully rudimentary but we note that
models of agglomeration often lead to a similar reduced form where wages increase with urban
scale (Duranton and Puga, 2004).
Equation (1) can be rewritten as log wij = logΦj + log eij. For now, we assume that all firms
in city c have the same technology and face the same input prices and trade costs for their output
so that log wi = logΦc + log eic where the wage shifter Φc is a function of urban scale and worker
i’s efficiency e depends on some permanent characteristics of that worker and some city specific
shock for that worker. To measure urban scale, we use density (population or employment per
unit of land-area) and assume a log-linear effect. For worker i, when located in city c, we end up
with:
log wic = α log denc + ηc + ui + ε ic , (3)
where denc is density in city c, ηc is a city-effect aimed at capturing characteristics of city c including
any natural advantage, ui is a worker effect, and ε ic is a shock specific to worker i in city c.
In the data, we do not observe the worker and city effects ui and ηc, which typically enter the
error term. We do not observe the whole set of possible wages that worker i would get in all cities
either. We only observe the wage in the city c(i) in which she is located. Therefore the specification
that is often estimated is not (3) but instead:
log wic(i) = α log denc(i) + ηc(i) + ui + ε ic(i) , (4)
or something more aggregated when only city averages are observed. Usually, the wage is denoted
wi instead of wic(i), the shock ε i instead of ε ic(i), city density denc instead of denc(i) and so on. This
somewhat hides that location choices can be endogenous, the reason why we prefer our notation.
This said, in regression (4), the main parameter of interest is α, the elasticity of wages with respect
to urban density.
3. The sources of estimation bias
An ols estimate for α in regression (4) is unbiased under the assumption that the covariance:
Cov
(
log denc(i), ηc(i) + ui + ε ic(i)
)
= Cov
(
log denc(i), ηc(i)
)
(5)
+ Cov
(
log denc(i), ui
)
+Cov
(
log denc(i), ε ic(i)
)
2However, other factors of production such as land remain typically unobserved. Prices are also unobserved (or if
they are it is unclear what they mean given quality differences). Hence, we do not expect standard ways to estimate tfp
to yield credible estimates for Aj. They are more likely to provide an estimate of Φj.
3Ciccone and Peri (2006) consider the effects of substitution across skill groups in a related problem, the estimation
of human capital externalities.
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is zero. When it differs from zero, any of the three covariances on the right-hand side of (5) is a
source of bias of the ols estimator. We discuss these three covariance terms in turn.
31 Endogenous quantity of labour
Ignoring the endogeneity of location for now, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (5),
which reduces to Cov (log denc, ηc) , is different from zero when density, denc, is correlated with
city fixed effects, ηc. A first possibility would be that, absent any location choice by workers, cities
with a natural advantage in production (high ηc) have greater fertility and end up with higher
density.
An arguably more serious concern today is that cities with a natural advantage in production
attract more workers. Let us ignore individual heterogeneity for now and consider a representative
worker whose utility in city c depends on the wage, log wc, and consumption amenities, µc:
Uc = U (log wc,µc) .
In this case, workers go to cities that offer high wages and high amenities.4 That is, density
increases with wages and amenities following aggregate location choices. Let us write this re-
lationship log linearly
log denc = β log wc + µc. (6)
At the same time, simplifying equation (4) to ignore individual heterogeneity implies log wc =
α log denc + ηc. Then, we can solve for density using this expression and (6) to get
log denc =
βηc + µc
1− αβ .
From this equation, it is easy to obtain:
(1− αβ)Cov (denc, ηc) = βvar(ηc) +Cov (µc, ηc) . (7)
This expression allows us to discuss in greater detail the circumstances under which the covariance
Cov (denc, ηc) is not zero.5
The first component of this covariance contains a term in var(ηc). It arises from the dependence
of density on the wage, itself a function of natural advantage. Hence any missing local natural
advantage that raises wages and makes cities denser will bias the estimation. The upward bias on
α depends on the importance of the population feedback, β.
The second component of the covariance in (7) is less obvious. In essence, the variables
that enter ηc as natural advantages might be correlated with amenities µc and this results in
Cov (ηc, µc) 6= 0. A first reason for this is that some city attributes affect both city productivity
(as natural advantage) and utility (as amenities). For instance, research centres co-locate with large
4Of course, we also expect urban costs to increase with density. This does not matter for our purpose here except
through the channels we mention below.
5Relative to a situation where workers are immobile, it must also be kept in mind that the covariance between density
and natural advantages is not calculated in the same way since allowing for mobility leads to population changes in all
areas.
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universities and are found in dense areas. Research centres might increase productivity and thus be
part of ηc. At the same time, universities may also be the source of cultural amenities like theatres
and restaurants. All this implies Cov (ηc, µc) 6= 0. Coastal location could be another example.
Being on a coast lowers trade costs and is thus a form of natural advantage in our model since it
raises the price net of trade cost pc. At the same time, workers might value coastal locations as
amenities.
A second, and potentially even more serious source of correlation between natural advantage
and amenities arises through the land market. As made clear by equation (6), amenities attract
workers. In turn, the resulting higher density implies higher land prices. At the same time firms
also consume land and land prices (through the term rc) enter the wage shifter Φc in equation (2).
This linkage implies a lower ηc. Consequently Cov (ηc, µc) 6= 0. This mechanism is at the core of
Roback’s (1982) spatial equilibrium framework which is widely used in empirical work on cities.
In sum, we have both a reverse causation and a missing variable problem. The issue of missing
variables is particularly severe since it applies to any variable that either affects productivity
directly or that affects any other other components of Φ indirectly.
The endogenous quantity of labour bias is made more complicated when we consider location
choices at the worker level. Consider worker i with utility Uic when located in city c. Utility for
this worker depends on the expected wage log w˜ic = E (log wic|denc,ηc,ui) in city c, consumption
amenities µc, and the characteristics of the workers ui:
Uic = U (logw˜ic,µc,ui) ,
so that workers will choose their location based on their expected wage and on their unobserved
individual characteristics. An additional issue is that the covariance term in (5) are indexed by the
city chosen by the worker. This location choice creates a selection effect on the cities on which the
covariance, Cov
(
ηc(i), µc(i)
)
, is computed. In other words, we have more individual observations
for those cities where both ηc and µc are high.
32 Endogenous quality of labour
Again, let us start the discussion by abstracting from workers’ location choice. The second term
on the right-hand side of (5), Cov (log denc, ui), is different from zero when the worker effect ui is
a consequence of local density. Better schools and universities in denser cities can make workers
born there more productive. In addition, learning at the workplace may be more important in
denser cities as suggested by Glaeser’s (1999) model. Empirically the importance of local learning
is asserted by Glaser and Maré (2001), Baum-Snow and Pavan (2010), or De la Roca and Puga
(2010). Faster learning in denser cities also implies Cov (log denc, ui) 6= 0.
Endogenous location choices can magnify these effects. Workers with a better learning potential
(and this may be correlated with ui) may choose to go to denser cities where more learning
takes place. But even if individual abilities are drawn independently from density, that is if
Cov (log denc, ui) = 0, we may have Cov
(
log denc(i), ui
)
6= 0 because of ability sorting. This can
happen because of a complementarity between workers’ skills and density (or city size). Such
complementarity appears for instance in the model of Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud
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(2010). Workers with more skills are more likely to become more productive entrepreneurs who
stand to gain more from being in denser cities. In turn, this pushes towards the sorting of more
skilled individuals in denser cities. Such complementarity between cities and skills is documented
empirically by a number of authors including Bacolod, Blum and Strange (2009) and Glaeser and
Resseger (2010). Other mechanisms are also possible. For instance, the amenities associated with
urban density mentioned above might be more appealing to more skilled workers, etc.
33 Shocks
Finally, and ignoring again location choices to begin, the last term on the right-hand side of
equation (5), Cov (log denc, ε ic), is different from zero when the realisation of the worker shocks
ε ic depends on density. A specific government policy (which would be treated like a shock in a
regression) might for instance lead to higher wages for certain groups of workers who are unevenly
distributed in space.6
Endogenous location choices can also create an extra effect on this covariance. Imagine that
workers observe the realisation of their shock in each city and choose their location accordingly.
Utility is now given by
Uic = U (logwic,µc,ui) , (8)
that is, the utility of worker i in a given city c depends on the exact wage she gets there, wic, rather
than her expected wage (unlike our previous example). This occurs when the location decision is
based on a precise job offer for instance. In that case, we may have Cov
(
log denc(i), ε ic(i)
)
6= 0
even though Cov (log denc, ε ic) = 0.
34 An aside on specification
While not properly speaking a source of bias, it is nonetheless important to clarify at this stage a
number of specification issues.
Many models imply that urban scale affects contemporaneous productivity. The level of aggreg-
ation for the analysis is thus the city and the regression considers both productivity and urban scale
at the same point in time. Beyond the models, the city size elasticity of wages (or productivity) is a
natural quantity to look at if one is interested in accounting for spatial wage disparities. Focusing
on one elasticity also makes it easier to compare results across studies.
This said, we expect the concentration of economic activity to affect outcomes at various spatial
scales with possibly some complex dynamics at play. For instance, the benefits from cities may
also include gradual learning by workers. It may then allow them to command a higher wage
anywhere. This type of effect needs to be taken into account to assess the overall benefits from
cities. However, if the objective here is to estimate the size elasticity of wages, it is only relevant to
the extent that it might bias the estimation of the city size elasticity of wage. Furthermore, many
interesting interactions take place at a spatial scale finer or broader than cities, neighbourhoods or
6One may also imagine that shocks are on average higher in denser cities because, for instance, they generate more
wage offers and workers are able to choose the best ones. We tend to think of such effects as being part of what we try
to measure as agglomeration effects.
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regions. Again, we only worry about these effects to the extent that they are correlated with our
key dependent variable, density. Understanding the dynamics of agglomeration effects in cities
and agglomeration effects at smaller or larger spatial scales are important endeavours but not part
of what we want to estimate here.
We usually prefer to use density as key independent variable to other measures of urban scale
such as counts of population or employment. This is because density may be more robust in
practice to arbitrary borders for cities.7 It could also be that the spatial scope of agglomeration
effects is geographically limited. Often, density captures ‘scale’ better than overall population. But
between density and population, this need not be one or the other. Arguably, these two variables
capture different things and might both be included in the regression. A good case can also be
made that aggregate shares of skills also matter (Moretti 2004a) and be included in the regression,
etc. Unfortunately, these supplementary independent variables are subject to the same estimation
concerns as density. Ideally, we want to be able to exclude them from the analysis while dealing
with the estimation problems for density. This may not be always possible. At a practical level,
we can only recommend checking what these extra city characteristics do to the estimation of the
coefficient of interest, α.
As in much of the literature, we have a log linear specification. Given that both wages and
density are right-skewed this is a natural way to estimate the regression. This type of specification
also comes straight from theory. But this remains a functional form assumption and nothing guar-
antees that this is reasonable. Empirically the relationship between urban scale and productivity
appears to be log linear in most cases (Au and Henderson, 2006, for China is an exception). Some
scrutiny is nonetheless warranted with every new data.
The more important issue is that not all workers and firms may benefit from agglomeration
with the same intensity. In addition, not all workers and firms contribute to agglomeration to
the same extent. Estimating an ‘average’ elasticity of wages with respect to size is interesting but
knowing about any heterogeneity within this relationship is the logical next step. There are at
least three dimensions of interest. The first, and historically the most prominent, is the sectoral
dimension. Since at least Henderson (1988), there is a long tradition that looks for agglomeration
effects within cities and sectors. A fascinating results is that for mature industries these effects
seem to be important whereas it is overall scale that appears to matter more for high-tech industries
(e.g., Henderson, Kuncuro, and Turner, 1995). The second dimension is the industrial organisation
of firms. Results by Rosenthal and Strange (2003, 2010) suggest that small firms are the main
beneficiaries and originators of agglomeration effects. The last one is the skill dimension. Recent
evidence by Bacolod, Blum, and Strange (2009) or Glaeser and Resseger (2010) among others
suggest that more skilled workers benefit more from being in larger cities.
7When using French employment areas, Greater Paris is divided into several units. So is New York when using us
counties.
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4. Which possible solutions?
We now explore a range of ‘solutions’ that have been proposed in the literature to deal with the
estimations biases described above.
41 Fixed effects
Let us start with a ‘naive’ ols regression in cross-section:
log wic(i) = α log denc(i) + ξic(i) , (9)
where ξic(i) = ηc(i) + ui + ε ic(i). This regression is subject to the three main sources of bias examined
above. To limit the covariance between log denc(i) and ui or ηc(i), one might consider, as a first
step, to introduce worker and city characteristics. They could solve partly the biases that emerge
even under exogenous location choices but not those due to the endogeneity of location choices.
Some worker characteristics such as age or gender might be added without too much to worry
about.8 Educational achievements are more suspicious since high wage cities might provide
more education. Observable city characteristics raise similar concerns since they are likely to
be simultaneously determined with wages. Using observables to proxy for the unobservables
ui or ηc(i) while making sure that the former are exogenous, is a worthwhile element of any
reasonable empirical strategy. Nonetheless we cannot expect too much from this first step. Nothing
guarantees that ‘exogenous’ observed city and worker characteristics will capture much of ui and
ηc.
The second step is to introduce fixed effects. This approach was pioneered by Glaeser and Maré
(2001). Fixed effects obviously raise the data requirements for the analysis. A single cross-section
of average wages by city is no longer enough. We need micro-data and be able to observe workers
at least twice. The simplest specification is to impose city and worker fixed effects, ηc and ui,
encompassing any unobserved city or worker characteristic invariant over time, together with
some time fixed effects and time-varying worker characteristics added as controls (not shown in
the equation):
log wic(it)t = α log denc(it)t + ηc(it) + ui + ε ic(it)t, (10)
where subscript c(it) refers to the city where worker i is located at date t. This specification
raises two issues. City effects are estimated only from the ‘movers’ (workers who change location
between two dates). With only ‘stayers’ we would not be able to identify city effects separately
from worker effects. Estimating from movers means estimating from a possibly highly selected set
of individuals. For instance, workers who move to dense cities are arguably those that stand to
gain the most from doing so.
The city fixed effects also imply that α is identified both from variations in density between
the cities at origin and destination for movers, and the time changes of density in cities where
stayers reside. The worry is then that there can be changes in the city characteristics, which might
8For all workers within the same city, city shocks need to be taken into account to estimate standard errors properly
(Moulton, 1990).
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drive changes in density. For instance, a new road network linking all the main cities may make
them more productive and attract more workers. This bias might be of minor importance when
estimating from the cross-section as in equation (9) since those new residents attracted by the new
road network might represent only a small fraction of city population. When using only the time
variation of wages and density, the bias is likely to be much larger since the new road network
may explain much of the population growth of cities. Put differently, α as estimated by (10) might
be more strongly biased than when using the naive cross-section estimate in (9): the fixed-effect
medicine can make the endogeneity disease worse.
To avoid this second problem and lessen the first one, it is possible to impose a city effect
for each time period ηct instead of a time-invariant fixed effect ηc. This allows unobserved city
characteristics to vary with time. For the effect of density to be identified, we then need to estimate
the regression in two stages
log wic(it)t = ηc(it)t + ui + ε ic(it)t , (11)
followed by
η̂ct = α log denct + ε2ct , (12)
where the second stage also contain time dummies and the first stage includes time-varying
worker characteristics. An alternative to (12) is to average city effects and density across years
to estimate η̂c = α log denc + ε2c. Equation (12) (or a close variant) corresponds to the specification
adopted by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008, 2010) or Mion and Nattichioni (2009). Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) discuss the econometric complications caused by the use of a city
fixed effect in the second stage as dependent variable and those created by a large number of fixed
effects for both each worker and each city and time period.9 How does the specification constituted
by (11) and (12) fare relative to our three sources of bias?
The endogenous quantity of labour bias is not dealt with (yet). We note that it only matters
in the second stage. The endogenous quality of labour bias is addressed, but only partially.
Permanent worker characteristics that make them command a higher wage on the labour market
are conditioned out. However, the time evolution of these unobserved worker characteristics is
ignored. This does not matter if this evolution is idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, changes in worker
effects might be caused by where they work and this is not taken into account. We return to this
issue very shortly. The shock bias is also partly dealt with. Moving to a given city when expecting
a good wage is no longer a source of bias unlike with the naive specification (9). However, moving
to a city because a worker receives a ‘good offer’ when this is correlated with density remains a
source of bias. We note however that a ‘good offer’ here means good conditional on the city and
time effect and the worker effect.
According to the results of Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) or Combes, Duranton,
Gobillon, and Roux (2010), the specification made of (11) and (12) yields values of α which are
9Note that the estimation procedure in two stages, (11) and (12), has an interesting property: when time-varying
worker variables are included in the model, their estimated effect does not depend on the city variables. This is because
the city fixed effects are left unspecified in the first stage and this allows for a correlation of unknown form between
worker and city variables. We can thus modify the specification of city variables in the second stage without changing
anything to the first stage regarding worker variables and their (estimated) effect. This property is not verified when
estimating directly variants of equation (10).
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about half of those obtained in the naive regression (9). More generally, controlling seriously for
individual characteristics using micro-data has large effects on the estimation of agglomeration
economies. The sorting of more productive workers into larger cities accounts for a large part of
the observed urban wage premium.
An alternative fixed effect strategy would be to adapt Moretti’s (2004b) estimation for human
capital externalities and impose a fixed effect for each worker and city:
log wic(it)t = α log denc(it)t + uic(it) + ε ic(it)t . (13)
With this regression, the effect of density is then estimated for each stayer by looking at how their
wage changes when density changes (allowing possibly for experience within a city to be taken
into account). Relative to the estimation in equation (11) and (12), there are differences in how this
alternative approach deals with the three sources of shocks. The endogenous quantity of labour
is ignored, just like above. The difference is that with equation (13) we estimate α from within
changes in density and do not rely on cross-city differences in levels. This is especially important
because productivity shocks that raise wages are also likely to attract more workers. As for the
endogenous quality of labour bias, equation (13) also conditions out time invariant worker effects.
It does it through the worker and city effect which is slightly more flexible than a permanent
worker effect. Finally, the shock bias is also treated slightly differently and the endogeneity of
location is not taken into account.
Returning to the specification made of (11) and (12), a key issue is that the wage growth of
workers appears to be stronger in large cities (e.g., Wheeler, 2001). This could be due to faster
learning making the worker abilities grow faster in larger cities.10 To understand how (missing)
learning by workers affects fixed-effect estimations, let us consider first a simple example of a
worker spending one period in the small city with city effect η, moving for n + 1 periods to the
large city with city effect η, before returning to the small city for one last period. The first period
wage in the small city is η. While staying in the large city, the worker learns x after each period.
Her wage in the large city is thus η during her first period, η + x during her second, and so on
until it reaches η + n x during her last period. We consider that what is learnt in the large city can
be used in the small city. In this case, the worker’s wage is η+ n x upon returning to the small city.
For this worker, the estimated effect for the small city is η + n x/2 whereas the estimated effect
for the large city is η + n x/2. The difference between the two is η − η. Wage differences are
thus properly estimated. However wage growth, possibly an important benefit from of cities
empirically, is entirely conditioned out. Again, this is not an issue provided we keep in mind
that we want to account for wage differences across cities, not measure all the benefits from
agglomeration.
Unfortunately, things are likely to be less clear-cut than in this special example. If learning is
concave instead of being linear, the estimated effect for the large city will be larger than η + n x/2
and the difference in wages between the two cities will thus be overestimated. If the worker spends
initially more time in the small city or does not eventually return there, the estimated effect for the
10Freedman (2008) considers a first-differenced version (11) where he introduces fixed effects. These fixed effects
capture the ability of workers to increase their productivity and possible spatial sorting of ‘fast learners’.
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small city will be lower and wage differences across the two cities will be overestimated again.11 It
could also be that what is learnt in the large city cannot be entirely transferred back to the small city.
Then, it becomes unclear what we mean by wage differences across cities. The non-transferable
part of learning in the large city becomes part of its estimated effect, which might be reasonable.
A further source of bias is possible. A worker in the large city may be reluctant to leave it
because of learning. Thus, this worker will only take a job in the small city when she receives a
very large positive error term (to compensate for foregone learning). The difference in wage when
moving to the small city will thus underestimate the true differences between the two cities. This
is a specific version of the shock bias.
A final alternative is to opt for a fully structural model that allows for both level and growth
effects of cities on worker effects and to attempt to match a number of moments of the data about
wage differences both across cities and over time as Baum-Snow and Pavan (2010).
42 Instruments
Our main worry at this stage is the endogenous quantity of labour bias. In equation (12) for
instance, the estimated city effect η̂ct (which captures wages corrected for worker effects and
whatever else is used as controls in the first stage) might be jointly determined with density. A
standard solution for that problem is to find one or more variables, refereed to as instruments and
noted zc, that have the following two properties. They can predict density and they are otherwise
uncorrelated with the city effects to be explained. Formally (and ignoring time variation), these
two conditions are
Cov(log denc, zc|.) 6= 0, (14)
for relevance and
Cov(e2c, zc|.) = 0, (15)
for exogeneity when estimating equation (12). The ability of candidate instruments to explain
an endogenous variable conditional on the other controls in the regression can be formally as-
sessed. Exogeneity is much harder to establish since it relies on a lack of correlation between
the instruments and the unobserved error term. Over-identification tests (also known as tests of
over-identifying restrictions) can be conducted when there are more instruments than parameters
to estimate. These test implicitly consists in comparing the estimators of the parameters obtained
using the different linear combinations of instruments. The hypothesis that the instruments are
valid is not rejected when the estimated parameters are close enough from each other. Unfortu-
nately we expect very similar instruments to lead to very similar parameters and thus pass their
overidentification tests. This should not be taken as a proof of instrument validity. Overidenti-
fication tests are more meaningful when the instruments are very different in nature. In practice,
the exogeneity of instruments needs to be carefully discussed by trying to understand what could
violate the exclusion restriction (15).
11More generally, we note that wage differences across cities are properly estimated because the effects for both the
small and large city are equally biased and this disappears when taking the difference between the two. Anything that
leads to a difference in bias between the two cities will lead to a biased difference.
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A number of instruments have been used in the literature since Ciccone and Hall (1996). Ciccone
and Hall’s (1996) instruments are mostly long lags of population. The underlying logic is that what
drove the location of population two hundred years ago is different from what drives it today
(to satisfy the exogeneity condition). At the same time there is much persistence in population
patterns, due perhaps to the durability of housing and urban infrastructure (to satisfy the relevance
condition). Ciccone and Hall (1996) find only a marginal decline in the elasticity of productivity
to density for the us. Replicating their strategy for France and Italy, Combes, Duranton, and
Gobillon (2008) and Mion and Nattichioni (2009) find similar results. Following Rosenthal and
Strange (2008) in a slightly different context, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2010) also
use the geological characteristics of regions. Fertile soils certainly drove the location of populations
when agriculture was a major part of the economy. That geological characteristics still affect the
productivity and wages of manufacturing and service sectors is more difficult to imagine. Finally,
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) also use some measure of geographical periphery like
Redding and Venables (2004). The reason for doing this is that more ‘central’ locations might be
more attractive independently from their productivity.12
While a reasonable defence of each of these instruments may be provided, none of them is
entirely foolproof and could be attacked (and they have). The good news however is that all these
instruments appear to give the same answer pointing at a minor endogenous quantity of labour
bias.
History, geography and geology are all ‘level’ instruments for density. If the empirical strategy
implies estimating the effects of density ‘within’ city or time first differencing, the instruments used
above become less relevant and their case for exogeneity is much weaker. In one specification,
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) impose a city fixed effect to equation (12) to estimate
η̂ct = α log denct + ηc + ε2ct. They use lagged city demographics to predict changes in density.
These instruments are somewhat weak and it is unclear if initially old cities decline in popula-
tion because of their age structure or if initially old cities are already poorly productive cities
in economic decline. A more promising alternative might be to use the initial sectoral structure
of employment interacted with national employment changes in those sectors to predict local
evolutions of population. Following Bartik (1991), there is a long tradition of doing this in labour
economics to explore a variety of issues. To our knowledge, this approach has not be used to
estimate the city size elasticity of wages or productivity.
Often, historical and geological instruments are not available to researchers. Then, they tend to
rely on the panel structure of the data to tackle endogeneity issues. Equation (10) can be rewritten
in first difference and lagged values of the right-hand side variables may be used as instrument in
a gmm approach. This strategy dates back to Henderson (1997) and was later applied, sometimes
with some methodological twists, by Henderson (2003), Combes, Magnac, and Robin (2004), and
Martin, Mayer, and Meyneris (2008). It is also used to estimate the effect of the market potential on
wages in structural models (Mion, 2004; Hanson, 2005).
12Ciccone (2002) uses the land area of spatial units to instruments for their density. To the extent that one uses areas
that were defined a log time ago, this may be viewed as a proxy for historical populations. Recently defined areas are
unlikely to be valid instrument since we expect land area to matter directly in determining wages as argued above.
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This approach suffers two caveats. First, as already noted early, identifying agglomeration
effects from the time variation of wages and density can be misleading. Second, the validity
of instruments is questionable. The variables used as instruments in the gmm approach are all
constructed from the lagged values of regressors (such as density). Given the length of those
lags, it cannot be argued that all those instruments are exogenous. Meaningful overidentification
tests could be conducted if we somehow knew that at least a subset of them is truly exogenous.
But it is hard to argue convincingly that this is the case. The fact that overidentification tests
are passed may be more indicative of some persistent patterns in the data than having solved
endogeneity problems. Put differently, overidentification tests can be passed when the estimators
of the parameters obtained using the different linear combinations of instruments all converge to
a value which is not the true value of parameters.
43 Modelling location choices explicitly
None of the approaches examined so far deals decisively with the fact that workers choose their
location. Typically (and at best) they address the fact that Cov (log denc, ηc) 6= 0 but not that
Cov
(
log denc(i), ηc(i)
)
may also be different from zero. Ideally the location choice of workers
would need to be modelled and become part of the estimation strategy to deal properly with the
endogeneity of the individual location choice in the wage equation.
This is an extremely hard thing to do on two counts. A desirable empirical strategy would first
estimate a location choice model followed by a wage equation. The first difficulty is that a choice
of location is discrete in nature and this choice is between a large number of locations.13 Even in
a static framework, this raises serious difficulties that can only be overcome through a demanding
strategy as demonstrated by Dahl (2002). To our knowledge, there is no methodology able to do
this in with panel data.
The second difficulty is perhaps even greater. Proper identification of both a location choice
model and a wage equation requires finding a variable that would explain the location without
having an effect on the wage. None of the usual determinants of migration is likely to satisfy this
exclusion restriction. For instance, married men with children are likely to be less mobile than
single childless men. However it is difficult to argue that family status is not associated in any
other way with the wage. It is.
Three short-cuts are possible. The first is to note that the location choice equation is non-linear
whereas the wage equation is. This implies that one can potentially identify α in a such a system.
But this would come entirely from the functional form and is unlikely to be convincing. A more
promising alternative is to put more structure behind both the location choice and the determ-
ination of wage before structurally estimating such a model like Baum-Snow and Pavan (2010).
The quality of the estimation then rest on the quality of the model.14 The third possibility is to
look for particular situations where mobility is artificially restrained or forcibly organised. Au and
13Nesting is not a relevant solution. It is hard to argue that migrants choose a city within a class size before choosing
a specific one. It is even harder to argue that migrants first choose a region and then a city within it.
14See Holmes (2010) for further discussion of structural approaches in agglomeration research.
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Henderson (2006) use mobility restrictions in China to assess net agglomeration effects. We discuss
this type of research next.
44 Quasi-experimental evidence
In areas of economic investigation such as education or welfare policy, experiments are possible
and much can be learnt from them. Experimenting with city size or urban density is not feasible in
most cases. However, there are particular circumstances that sometimes allow research to replicate
experimental conditions through the use of quasi-experiments (or natural experiments).
There is a nascent literature using quasi-experiments to investigate questions related to the
estimation of agglomeration economies. Davis and Weinstein (2008) use the exogeneity of the
bombing of Japanese cities to search for multiple equilibria in urban structure. Redding and Sturm
(2008) exploit the artificial partition of Germany after World War II to assess the importance of
market potential. More directly relevant for our purpose, Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti
(2010) devise a clever strategy to measure the productivity effects of exogenous labour demand
shocks. They use detailed information about bidding wars for large industrial plants in the us.
A county that receives one such plant may not be meaningfully compared to the rest of the us
in a simple difference-in-difference exercise. However this ‘winning’ county can be compared
to the ‘runner-up’ county that remained in the bidding process until the very last stage. After
providing evidence that winning and runner-up counties are ex-ante observationally very similar,
Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) show that incumbent plants in the winning county
experience a large increase in productivity relative to incumbent plants in the runner-up county.15
A limitation of this sort of approach is that the ‘experiment’ is often very limited in scope.
Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) can only assess the productivity effect of a specific shock
on other large industrial plants that survive throughout their study period. How much what is
learnt from this can be extrapolated to other types of producers and sectors is hard to know. That
their results are consistent with other results mentioned above is reassuring. Hopefully future
research will be able to provide more evidence of that sort.
45 Firm selection and firm sorting
Early on in the derivation of the model of section 2, we made the simplifying assumption that all
firms in a city had access to the same technology. We know they do not. Within cities, there are vast
differences in measured total factor productivity (Syverson, 2004; Combes, Duranton, Gobillon,
Puga, and Roux, 2009). These tfp differences raise two separate issues.
The first is that firms might be immobile but market selection might be at play and this would
make the distribution of productivity endogenous. In a nutshell, the argument relies on the idea
that denser cities are ‘tougher’ markets. If market selection eliminates the least productive firms,
we should then expect productivity to be on average higher in denser cities. Put differently, market
selection might be confounded with agglomeration. Both agglomeration and market selection raise
15That productivity remains about stable in the winning county whereas it strongly declines in the runner-up raises
some interesting questions.
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average productivity in denser cities. To distinguish between market selection and the other forces
behind the wage shifter Φc, we note that market selection should act by truncating the productivity
distribution in denser cities whereas agglomeration forces should have a positive effect on the
whole distribution of productivities. Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2009) develop
a new empirical approach to assess greater truncation vs. right-shift or dilation in the distribution
of firm productivity for large cities vs. small cities in France. They find no evidence of greater
truncation. Future research will confirm or qualify this finding.
Another possibility is that mobile firms might ‘sort’. It would be tempting to use a fixed-effect
strategy to deal with that issue and attempt to separate firm effects from local effects. However,
such approach is likely to be problematic. Only a small proportion of firms move between metro-
politan areas every year (Duranton and Puga, 2001). This scarcity of movers makes identification
imprecise and suggests that trying to separate firm from local effects might not be meaningful.
Furthermore, when firms move, they do not do so randomly. Evidence shows that they move
predominantly from larger to smaller cities and, according to theory, might do so following a
positive productivity shock. This will bias fixed-effect estimates. Rather than the sorting of firms,
it may be more promising to look at the sorting of entrepreneurs (e.g., Michelacci and Silva, 2007).
5. Conclusions
Significant progress has been achieved in the estimation of agglomeration economies over the last
10 years. Standard estimates for the density elasticity of wages now typically range from 0.02
to 0.05. This level of precision may seem satisfactory relative to a number of other important
elasticities that the economic profession has attempted to estimate. However, the existence of a
consensus is no guarantee of reliability.
We hope further progress will be made on the quality of identification. New plausible instru-
ments are desirable. New quasi-experiments may be waiting to be analysed. Being able to deal
seriously with individual location choices is fundamental. The difficulty of this problem suggests
that we should remain open-minded in terms of methodology. In particular, structural modelling
should be useful in making progress here.
While better estimates are needed, it is also important to explore at greater depth what lies
behind the ‘average’ values that research has uncovered so far. Knowing more about how different
types of workers and firms benefit from cities is of first-order importance. There has been work on
the sectoral dimension, but heterogeneity by skills and types of firms has only begun to be touched.
Hopefully, the dynamics of the agglomeration benefits will also be a vibrant area of progress. Trust
in our estimates of agglomeration effects will also be bolstered by knowing more about their exact
sources and the channels through which they percolate.
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